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Article 6

NOTES
BILLS AND

NOTEs -

FORGERY -

FRAUDULENT

IMPERSONATION.-

Despite the efforts of the codifiers to make the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law so clear and definite that the conflicts would be done
away with, the courts are still divided in construing the defense of
fraudulent impersonation. This is shown by the result of the recent case
of Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank of Brooklyn.' In this case a check for
$4,500 was indorsed in blank by E and given to an agent with authority
to buy a condemnation award. The agent indorsed the check specially,
by writing over the blank indorsement, "Pay to the order of Harry
Wolter," and delivered the check to a person who was represented to
him by third persons to be the owner of record of the award. Neither
E nor the agent had had previous dealings with either Wolter or the
imposter, except at the closing of the sale. The imposter sold the check
to an innocent purchaser, who presented it and. received payment. The
bank which of course debited E's account is now sued to recredit 's
account. The court held that the loss fell on the bank, because the imposter's signature was a forgery. Only where the physical presence of
the imposter is combined with antecedent dealings with maker of check
and intention of the maker of check to deal with visible person will a
bona fide holder of a check be entitled to recover from the maker of
the check.
In regard to fraudulent impersonation cases, the ques'ion as to who
must bear the loss as between a drawer who delivers a check to an imposter and one who cashes it, may arise in various ways. In its simplest
form the drawee bank has paid it upon the indorsement of the imposter
and charged it against the drawer's account, or between. the drawer and
holder in due course, who has bought through the imposter's indorsement. Again the drawee may seek to recover back the amount from the
party to whom it paid the money.
The whole question depends on what kind of a defense the courts
construe the delivery to an impersonator to be. If the courts consider
the defense to be forgery then it is good against a bona fide holder;
however, if the defense is fraud, then a bona fide holder is protected
and the drawee is protected. All courts construe the maker or drawer
to have a double intent. "First, he intends to make the instrument payable to the person before him or to the person writing at the other end
of the line, in case the negotiation is by correspondence. 2 Second, he
intends to make the instrument payable to the person whom he believes the stranger to be." 3 The courts by the great weight of authority
hold the first to be the controlling intent except where the named payee
1 276 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E. (2d) 457 (1937).
2
8

Urinola v. Twin Fals Bank & Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080 (1923).
BANNiAN, NEGoTIABLE INsTRUmiNTs LAW (5th ed.) 310.
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was already known to. the maker or drawer or endorser,4 or was more
particularly identified in some way. For instance, the last exception is
illustrated by the case of Mercantile NationalBank v. Silverman,5 where
the check was made out to the supposed payee, and his official title added, "Lt. Col. Coast Artillery Corps." The imposter cashed it, and it was
charged to drawer's account. The court held that the designation of
payee by his official title distinguished the case from other cases of
fraudulent impersonation and the drawee bank must bear the loss. In
other words, the second intent controlled. The difference in these cases
may in part be due to variations in the amount of care taken by the
parties in regard to the identification of the imposter, or whether the
payee was purely fictitious or was a real person.
It must be noted in these fraudulent impersonation cases that the
drawer believes the imposter to be a real person to whom he delivers
the instrument or to whom he writes in case of negotiation by correspondence; hence the rule 6 that an instrument made payable to a nonexistent person is in legal effect to bearer does not apply since that rule
only applies when the fictitious character of the payee is known to the
drawer.
The general rule where the drawer delivers a check to an imposter,
as payee, supposing him to be the person whom he has falsely represented himself to be, is that the imposter's subsequent indorsement of
the check is regarded as genuine so far as bona fide subsequent holders
are concerned. 7 The leading case supporting the minority rule is Tolman v. American Nat. Bank.8 There, the impersonator received the
check and indorsed the name of the person falsely impersonated, sold
it to a person who collected from the drawee bank. The court held that
the drawee bank had to bear the loss, saying: "It is a manifest fallacy
to say that the drawee carried out the intention of the drawer. The
fact that the person falsely impersonated was looked up and found
responsible showed the true intention of the drawer, and this was a
typical case of forgery." The court said further that the courts supporting the other rule lose sight of the distinction between real and fictitious
persons. In the latter case there is no one to inquire about.
Rossi v. Nat. Bank, 71 Mo. App. 150 (1897).
132 N. Y. S. 1017 (1911), affirmed, 210 N. Y. 567, 104 N. E. 1134.
6 N.I.L. § 9 (3).
7 United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (E. D. Wis., 1891); Meridian Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N. E. 247, 34 N. E. 608,
52 Am. St. Rep. 450 (1893). See, also, cases cited in Annotation, 22 A. L. R. 1228,
1230.
8 22 R. I. 462, 48 Atl. 480, 52 L. R. A. 877, 84 Am. St. Rep. 850 (1901).
See, also: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bi-Metallic Bank, 17 Colo. App. 230, 68 Pac.
4
5

115 (1902); Harmon v. Old Det. Nat. Bank, 153 Mich. 73, 116 N. W. 617, 17

L. R. A. (N. S.) 514, 126 Am. St. Rep. 467 (1908).

NOTES
The theory most often used to support the majority rule is that the
drawee by paying to the imposter carries out the real intent of the
drawer at the time of delivery, though the intention had its origin in
fraud. The reasoning behind giving protection to drawees is that in delivering the check to an impersonator, the drawer increased the bank's
ordinary risk, and also that the person whom the drawer intended to
pay has been paid. 9 To strengthen this reason or as a substitute for
the theory of actual intent some courts uphold the majority rule by
using the theory of negligence or estoppel, which can be more broadly
stated as the doctrine that as between two innocent persons the one
whose act caused the loss should bear that loss.1 0 In these cases there
need be no express negligence, but mere mistake will be enough. 1 The
latter theory is better than the actual intent theory, for it obviates
ascribing an intent to the drawer to deliver to an imposter, when in
fact the drawer is not entirely satisfied with the imposter's identity, and
in fact had another intent. Thus these two theories are supplementary
and clinch the case for the majority rule, to which is added Section 23
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which states that a person may be
"precluded from setting up the defense of forgery," and this preclusion
arises from the theory of estoppel.
Another way that an imposter may work is by assuming to be an
agent of the payee. In this circumstance the cases have no difficulty in
arriving at the conclusion that the loss falls on the drawee and not on
12
the drawer, in the absence of negligence on the part of the drawer.
Here it is obvious that the drawer can have no intent to deliver to the
person before him.
In conclusion, then we may say' that the courts ascribe a double intent to the drawer when he delivers the check to an imposter. He intends to deliver the check to the person before him and also to deliver
to the person named in the check. The courts generally consider the
first intent controlling, except where the named payee was already
known to the drawer or was more particularly identified in some way.
But the New York court, in Cohen v. Lincoln Say. Bank of Brooklyn,
added a further restriction to the application of the first intent by saying that antecedent dealings must exist between the imposter and
drawer before that first intent may be said to bV' controlling. This restriction is not mentioned by other courts, nor is it expressly mentioned
9 Montgomery G. Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co., 94 N. J.Law 152,
v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N. W.

109 At. 296 (1920); McCornack
542 (1926).

10 Land Title & T. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 AtI. 420,
50 L. R. A. 75, 79 Am. St. Rep. 717 (1900); Galo v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 199
N. Y. 222, 92 N. E. 633, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 66 (1910).
11 United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank, op. cit. supra note 7.
12 City of St. Paul v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, 151 Minn. 485, 187 N. W. 516
(1922). See, also, cases cited in Annotation, 22 A. L. R. 1228.
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in previous decisions in New York, although the court maintains that
such restriction was implicit in the facts of those previous cases. It is
surprising that a New York court would thus impede the negotiability
of commercial paper by this extension of the defense of forgery. The
logic and desirability seem to be against this decision, and no doubt
other courts will not follow this decision to restrict a rule which the
modem courts tend to uphold almost unanimously.
Frank J. Lanigan.

EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE

AGAINST

SELF-INCRIMINATION.-The

Fifth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, among
other things, that: "No person .

.

. shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. ." A similar provision is incor-

porated into the constitutions of all the states of the Union except
Iowa and New Jersey.' These two states having no express provisions
in their constitutions regarding the privilege against self-incrimination
the question arises as to whether this privilege is granted in some other
form, the Fifth Amendment, as do all the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, applying only to the Federal Government.
In New Jersey the privilege exists as a part of the common law
of the state.2 In Iowa, although there is no constitutional provision
with regard thereto, the privilege is considered to be fundamental, and
it has been said by the supreme court of Iowa that the privilege is secured by the due process clause of the constitution.3 However the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the privilege against
self-incrimination is not one of the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States which the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution forbids the states to abridge, and, also, that it does not
fall within the
protection of the due process of law clause of that
4
Amendment.
There is considerable conflict of opinion in this country with regard
to one phase of the privilege against self-incrimination, and that is
with regard to the admissibility in evidence of the results of a physical
examination of one accused of crime when such examination was not
voluntarily consented to. Some of the states hold such evidence to be
32 ILL. L. Rav. 117, n. 1; 18 Ky. L. J. 18, 19.
2 State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. Law. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (1903); State v. Miller,
71 N. J. Law. 527, 60 AtI. 202 (1905).
3 State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902); Duckworth v. District Court of Woodbury County, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N. W. 715 (1936).
4 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
1

NOTES
inadmissibile; some say it is admissible; while others attach
various
5
conditions and restrictions to the admissibility thereof.
Wigmore, in his exhaustive work on Evidence,6 relates the history
of the privilege, the causes which led to its introduction, and the purposes which it is to serve, and points out the fact that all the confusion on the subject arose from erroneous dicta in the case of Boyd
v. United States. 7 Wigmore says that looking at the history of the
privilege, it having arisen to rectify the evils resulting from the "inquisitorial method of putting the accused upon his oath," and also at
its policy, which is "to stimulate the prosecution to a full and fair
search for evidence procurable by their own exertions, and to deter
them from a lazy and pernicious reliance upon the accused's confessions," it is only testimonial compulsion that falls within the privilege.
He sums up his conclusions as follows: "The privilege protects a person from any disclosure sought by legal process against him as a witness." 8
Therefore, according to Wigmore and the decisions of the courts
of a number of the states, the results of an involuntary physical examination of the accused are admissible, the compulsion used in such
cases not being testimonial compulsion. However, the fact remains that
such matter is construed as falling within the privilege in some states,
and hence it is not admissible therein.
Relatively recent innovations give rise to new questions with regard to this particular phase of the privilege against self-incrimination.
One of these is the polygraph or lie-detector. Apparently there are
only two criminal cases in the United States in which an appellate
court has passed upon the admissibility into evidence of the results of
the application of the lie-detector. 9 However, in neither of these cases
did any question with regard to the privilege against self-incrimination
arise as the tests were voluntarily submitted to. It is interesting to
note that the results of the tests were rejected in both cases,-in the
case of Frye v. United States,1 0 because the lie-detector bad not as-yet
passed out of the experimental stage, and in the case of State v.
Bohner," for the same reason and for the additional reason that the
test had not been made in the presence of the prosecution so that they
would have had an opportunity to use it had the result been different.
In commenting upon the latter case Wigmore says: "The latter reason
is sound, for the test should be so taken as to be available in evidence
5
6
7
8

24 ILL. L. REV. 487.
4 WIGMORE ON EvDENCE (2nd ed. 1923) §§ 2250, 2263, 2264, 2265.
116 U. S. 616 (1885); 4 ,VIGMORE ON Evimn ,zc(2nd ed. 1923) § 2264.
4 WiGMoRz ON EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1923) § 2263.

9 Frye v. United States, 54 D. C. App. 46, 293 Fed. 1013
Bohner, 210 Wis. 651,,246 N. W. 314 (1933).
10 Op. cit. supra note 9.
11 Op. cit. supra note 9.

(1923);

State v.
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regardless of the result; but the former reason is not tenable, for the
instrument named has demonstrated its utility in the hands of an expert . . ." 12
The lie-detector being scientifically accurate in the hands of an
expert, would the use thereof over the protestations of the accused
violate the privilege against self-incrimination? It is submitted that
it need not because "even if the 'association word' method of detection
were used, the reaction words would not be testimonial." 13 However,
since the lie-detector records a definite reaction whether the subject
talks or remains silent is the privilege thereby violated? 14 It seems that
it is not, if we adhere strictly to the theory of the privilege as set out
by Wigmore, i. e., protection from any disclosure sought by legal process against one as a witness. In such case, again, the compulsion is not
testimonial. The use of the lie-detector is a kind of physical examination of the accused, and the results admissible as such.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that such use of the liedetector is equivalent to the extraction of statements from the lips of
the accused, the objection thereto would fail for the reason above set
out that such compulsion is not testimonial-not by process of law or
its equivalent.15 In such case the question becomes one of an untrustworthy confession, which is wholly distinct from and unconnected with
the privilege against self-incrimation.' 6 Thus, so far as this privilege
is concerned the use of the lie-detector is unobjectionable in those jurisdictions which follow Wigmore's view of the matter. "However, the use
of the deception test might result in defeating the purpose of the
privilege in that the prosecution would rely on the result of the test
and not seek other sources of evidence." 17
Another instance in which a question as to the violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination might arise is with regard to the
increasing use of devices to determine whether or not one is or was
intoxicated at a certain time. Although such devices are in the experimental stage, it is quite probable that their use may become highly
developed and commonplace. In those states that adhere to Wigmore's
theory of the privilege, the evidence so obtained will, in all probability,
be admissible. As to what the other states might hold in such a situation, it is difficult to say. Doubtless, many of them will hold the evidence inadmissible if they cling to their present theories regarding the
subject.
Rex E. Weaver.
12
438.
13
14
15
16

17

WIGuORE ON EVIDENCE, SUPPLEMENT TO SECOND EDITION (1934)

37 HLv. L. REV. 1138.
WIO ORE ON EVIDENCE,

SUPPLEMENT TO SECOND EDITION

4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1923) § 2265.
4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1923) § 2266.

37 -IARv.L. REV. 1138.

n.

2, p.

(1934) p. 1022.

NOTES
PAYMENT-MISTAKE or LAw.-Generally, money paid under mistake of law cannot be recovered. This rule, though sustained by the
great majority of the state courts in the past,' has been criticised frequently. 2 In 1802, in the famous case of Bilbie v. Lzmley, 3 where the
question was whether money paid under a mistake of law could be recovered, Lord Ellenborough refused relief. In that case, quasi-contractual recovery of money paid upon an insurance policy, under the mistaken belief that there was no legal defense, was denied because the mistake was one of law. This conclusion was rendered in direct repudiation of several earlier decisions both at law 4 and in equity,5 where the
relief for mistake of law had been granted. Lord Ellenborough later
changed his mind, when the precedents were brought to his attention,
as was evidenced by the subsequent holding in Perrott v. Perrott.6
Regardless of the reversal of the Bilbie case, its decision was adopted
7
in many American jurisdictions, with the exception of two states,
without question of the soundness of its doctrine, and was also taken
up in England.8
The reason most generally given for the rule, is that offered by Lord
Ellenborough: "Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law." 9
This presumption has been responsible for denying recovery of money
paid under mistake of law, and has been severely censored and commented upon by many learned justices.' 0 "It is true that this so-called
1 Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674 (1824) (excess rent paid by tenant); New
York City Employees' Retirement System v. Elliot, 267 N. Y. 193, 196 N. E. 23
(1935); Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Gramling, 160 So. 725, (Ala. App. 1935);
Jordan v. Johns, 79 S.W. (2d) 798 (Tenn. 1935); State v. Perlstein, 79 S.W.
(2d) 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Black v. Mosher, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 532, 54
Pac. (2d) 492 (1936); Andrews v. National Oil Co., 204 N. C. 268, 168 S.E.
228 (1933) (money paid for goods in excess of that received); Austin v. Dunn,
176 Wash. 453, 29 Pac. (2d) 740 (1934) (mistake as to amount of land paid for) ;
Gem Building & Loan Ass'n of Newark v. Town of Belleville, 117 N. J. Law 59,
186 AtI. 466 (1936).
2 KnF.R, QUAsX-CoNTRACTS (1893) 85-122; WOODWARD, LAW or QUASICONTRACTS (1913) 35; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1574.

3 2 East 469 (1802).
4 Hewer v. Bartholomew, Cro. Eliz. 614, 78 Eng. Rep. 855 (Q. B. 1597)
(recovery of money paid under mistake of law in action of account).
5 Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 2 Jac. & W. 205, 37 Eng. Rep. 605 (Ch. 1730)
(cancellation of partition agreement made under a mistake of law).
6 Perrott v. Perrott, 14 East 423, 104 Eng. Rep. 665 (K. B. 1811).
7 Ray v. Bank of Ky., 3 B. Mon. 510 (1843); Northrop's Executors v.
Graves, 19 Conn. 547, 50 Am. Dec. 264 (1849).
8 Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143 (1813) (by a divided court, it was decided that an officer who made payment of prize money to a superior, both parties
mistakenly believing that the law required this, could not obtain restitution).
9 Bilbie v. Lumley, op. cit. supra note. 3.
10 Per Lord Mansfield, Jones v. Randall, Cowp. 37 (1774); Martindale v.
Faulkner, 2 C. B. 719 (1846); Montrion v. Jeffries, 2 Car. & P. 113, 116 (1825)
(The court said: "God forbid that it should be imagined, that an attorney, or a
counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law.").

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

rule has been declared by courts in general terms, and it is a popular
derivative of the maxim that 'ignorance of the law excuses no man';
but this application of the maxim is fallacious, and there is no such
rule of exclusion from relief at law or in equity of suitors who seek to
have some legal act declared void upon the ground that it was done
through mistake of law." 11 It has also been said that to permit recovery would lead to promiscuity and indiscrimination. However, it
seems that it would not lead to great uncertainty, as recovery for mistake of fact is allowed in most jurisdictions today. 12 One would not be
be more induced to commit fraud or injustice if there was an allowance for a mistake of law as well as one of fact. 13 It would be as easy
for one to feign ignorance of fact as one of law. There does not appear
to be a valid reason for the maintenance of the rule, except perhaps,
the poor precedent set up by Lord Ellenborough.
At least two states have consistently denied the principal case by
decision,-Connecticut 14 and Kentucky.' 5 In the former State, a leading case was Northrup's Executors v. Graves,16 where the court said:
"The mind no more assents to the payment made under a mistake of
the law, than if made under a mistake of facts; the delusion is the
same in both cases; in both, alike, the mind is influenced by false motives." And in the latter State, a similar view has been acted upon in
the great majority of the cases. In City of Covington v. Powll 17 the
judge held: "Upon the whole. .

.

.whenever, by a clear and palpable

mistake of law or fact, essentially bearing upon and affecting the contract, money has been paid, without cause or consideration, which, in
law, honor, or conscience, ought not to be retained, it was, and ought
to be recovered back." Even in England there has been some disposition to rebel against the old rule laid down by Lord Ellenborough.' s
King v. Doolittle, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 77 (1858).
KawmR, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 23; Mobile County v. London &
Lancashire Ins. Co., 173 So. 99 (Ala. App. 1937); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Mundy, 167 So. 894 (La. App. 1936).
13 5 COL. L. REv. 367 (1905).
14 Northrop's Executors v. Graves, op. cit. supra note 7; Stedwell v. Anderson, 21 Conn. 139, (1851) (a party, who had paid money under a mistake as to
his rights and duties, which he was under no legal or moral obligation to pay,
and which the party receiving it had no right, in good conscience, to retain,
might recover it back, in an action at law, whether the mistake was one of fact
or law) ; Gilpatric v. City of Hartford, 98 Conn. 471, 120 Ad. 317 (1923) (incorrect apportionment of tax due to mistake of law by state treasurer).
15 Ray v. Bank of Ky.. op. cit. supra note 7; Bruner v. Stanton, 43 S. W.
411 (Ky. 1897) (liquor license fee paid under invalid ordinance); Supreme Council Catholic Knights of America v. Fenwick, 169 Ky. 269, 183 S.W. 906 (1916)
(mistakenly paying insurance premiums).
16 Northrop's Executor's v. Graves, op. cit. supra note 7.
17 City of Covington v. Powell, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 226 (1859).
18 Rogers v. Ingram, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 351 (1876); Daniel v. Sinclair, 6 A. C.
181 (1881); Stanley Bros., Ltd., v. Corporation of Nuneaton, 107 L. T. R. 760
(1912).
11

12

NOTFS
Thus, it is seen that these three jurisdictions have led in the recognition
of the short-comings of the Bilbie case, and have dared to encroach upon its holding.
Recently, moreover, several states have made legislative attempts
to eliminate the distinction between a mistake of law, and one of fact.
At present, at least six jurisdictions, Montana, California, Oklahoma,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Georgia, have modified the rule by
enactment. 19 With the exception of Georgia, the statutes are practically identical. 20 Before the statute, Georgia held that money paid under
a mistake of law might be recovered; but, money paid in ignorance of
the law could not be regained. This court elucidated on the distinctions
in Culbreath v. Culbreath:21 "Ignorance implies passivity; mistake implies action. Ignorance does not pretend to knowledge, but mistake assumes to know. Ignorance may be the result of laches, which is criminal; mistake argues diligence, which is commendable." The distinction
'eached in this case has been accepted and approved generally by the
State in its legislative movement, as is evidenced by its statute. The
court of South Carolina has also drawn a distinction between mistake
and ignorance of law, granting relief for mistake, and denying it when
22
the payment was due to ignorance.
There are certain exceptions and limitations to the general rule
denying recovery for money paid under mistake of law. 23 The Restate-

ment of the Law of Restitution 24 states the rule:
"A person who conferred a benefit upon another because of an
erroneous belief induced by a mistake of law that he is under a duty so
to do, is entitled to restitution as though the mistake were one of fact if:
(a) the benefit was conferred by a state or sub-division,2 5 or (b) the
benefit was received on behalf of a court which has control over its
disposition,2 6 or (c) the mistake was as to the law of a State in which
CAL. C iv. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 1576, 1578; MoN. REv. CODE (Choate
7486; N. D. Coup. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 5855; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929)

19

1921)

§

§ 9423; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 37204; Hadley v. Farmers' Nat. Bank of Okla., 125 Okla., 250, 257 Pac. 1101 (1927);
§ 822; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1932)

City of Petaluma v. I-Ickey, 90 Cal. App. 616, 266 Pac. 613 (1928). Contra: In re
Estate of Mcflrath, 276 Ill. App. 408 (1934); Miners' & Merchants' Bank of
Nanty-Glo Case, 313 Pa. 118, 169 At. 85 (1933).
20 With the exception of Georgia, the other statutes are very similar.
21 Culbreath v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 64, 50 Am. Dec. 155 (1849).
22 Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 623, 23 Am. Dec. 155 (1831);
Hutton v. Edgerton, 6 S. C. 485 (1875).
23 Ex parte James, L. R. 9 Ch. 609 (1874); Moulton v. Bennett, 18 Wend.
(N. Y.) 586 (1836) (payments to attorney by adversary's client).
24 RESTATEmzNT OF = LAW OF REsTITUTION (1937) § 46.
25 Demopolis v. Marengo County, 195 Ala. 214, 70 So. 275 (1915) (money
paid under a void appropriation); Heidt v. U. S., 56 Fed. (2d) 559 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932).
26 United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30, 35 (1887) (Justice Swayne held
that the United States could not hold the money of an innocent party, which had
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the transferor neither resided nor did business, except a mistake of law
in the payment of taxes, 27 or (d) the mistake was as to the validity of
a judgment subsequently reversed. 28 Money paid for taxes, as pointed
out above, is held to be an exception, and recovery is denied. 29 In a recent Pennsylvania decision it was held that the Federal Government
was not entitled to money mistakenly refunded to a taxpayer by reason
of a mistake of law.3 0 Recovery has also been allowed where the
plaintiff benefited the defendant, anticipating a return which was not
made because the agreement was found to be void or unenforceable. 3'
The courts have accordingly permitted restitution when money was paid
for a purpose which could not be carried out or where the transferor
32
did not get a return that he expected to get.
It is frequently asserted that equity will not grant relief for a pure
mistake of law; 3 3 but, the courts generally give relief for such mistakes on principles similar to those that they apply in a mistake of fact.
The courts of equity justify their assertion on the same grounds as
gone into its treasury by means of fraud. He said: "An action will lie whenever
the deferidant has received money which the defendant is obliged by natural
justice and equity to refund."). The theory behind allowing recovery for money
paid to a public officer under mistake of law, is that persons dealing with such
officers are right in assuming that the officers are acquainted with the law.
27 Osincup v. Henthorn, 89 Kan. 58, 130 Pac. 652, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 174
(11913) (mistake as to law of descent in state other than that of the residence
of both parties) ; Bank of Chillicothe v. Dodge, 8 Barb. 233 (1850) (complainant
living in Ohio discounted instruments payable to defendant, a New York person,
the instrument being void in New York); Miller v. Bieghler, 123 Ohio St. 227,
174 N. E. 774 (1931) (Ohio parties exchanged land, and there was a mistake as
to Texas title). The courts generally allow recovery on the basis that the mistake as to foreign law is a mistake of fact.
28
Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S. W. (2d) 969 (1933); Golde Clothes
Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N. Y. 465, 141 N. E. 917 (1923); B. & 0.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 781 (1927).
29 Prescott v. Memphis, 154 Tenn. 462, 285 S. W. 587 (1926); New Orleans
v. Jackson Brewing Co., 126 La. 121, 110 So. 110 (1926); Coleman v. Inland
Gas. Corp., 231 Ky. 637, 21 S. W. (2d) 1030 (1929). See: 7 CoL. L. REV. 601; 45
HAv. L. REv. 501.
30 U. S. v. Hart, 12 F. Supp. 596 (1935).
31 General Paint Co. v. Kramer, 68 Fed. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) (an
oral contract was found to be within the Statute of Frauds); BedeU v. Oliver H.
Bair Co., 104 Pa. Super. Ct. 146, 158 AUt. 651 (1932); Shaw v. Board of Education, 38 N. Mex. 298, 31 Pac. (2d) 993 (1934).
32 Wayne County Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 244 N. Y. 351, 155 N. E.
669 (1927) (payment of undue war tax). Contra: Kazwell v. Reynolds, 250 Ill.
App. 174 (1928); Heckman Co. v. I. S. Dawes & Son, 12 Fed. (2d) 154 (1926).
33 Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 8 Wheat. 174, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 700
(1828); Taylor v. B.uttrick, 165 Mass. 547, 43 N. E. 507 (1896); Mitchell v.
Holman, 30 Ore. 280, 47 Pac. 616 (1897); Williams v. Gillespie, 291 N. Y. S.
513 (1937); Breit v. Bowland, 100 S. W. (2d) 599, 92 S. W. (2d) 110 (Mo. App.,
1937); Bowen v. Pursel, 109 N. J. Eq. 67, 156 Atl. 649 (1931); Finnell v. People's Bank, 182 S. E. 888 (W. Va. 1935).
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34
courts of law, by saying that everyone is presumed to know the law.
In Hunt v. Rousmanier's Administrators35 a letter of attorney to execute a bill of sale .of a ship was taken by a creditor from a debtor, under the impression that it was valid as security. The debtor died, and
as the letter of attorney was revoked by death, the security was invalidated. It was held that mistake of the parties as to the legal effect
of the instrument was no grounds for relief. In their effort to grant
relief, and prevent great injustice by the enforcement of the general
doctrine, the courts have declared that a mistake as to the title to
property, as to the existence of certain particular rights, as to the law
of another state or country, or even as to the duties or obligations
imposed by an agreement, were really mistakes of fact and not law,
and thus did not constitute a bar to relief.3 6 Some courts set forth a
distinction between ignorance and mistake of law, correcting the latter,
but denying aid for ignorance while others even refuse to distinguish
37
between mistakes of fact and law.
There has been no question about granting relief against a mistake
of law where the mistake was accompanied with unequitable conduct
of the other party such as fraud, misrepresentation, and threats amounting to duress.38 In its great attempt to relax the general rule denying
recovery, courts hold that upon receipt of money paid in mistake of

84 See: 2 POmEROY, EQury JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) § 842; 1 STORY,
EQUITY JuRisPRuDENcE (14th ed.) § 173. In Jordan v. Stevens, 51 Me. 78, 81

Am. D. 556 (1863), the court said: "The ground on which the doctrine rests is
this, that it is impossible to uphold the government, and so to maintain its administration as to protect public and private rights, except on the principle that
the rights and liabilifies of every one shall be the same as if he knew the law."
35 Op. cit. supra, note 33.
36 United Commercial Travelers v. McAdam, 61 C. C. A. 22, 125 Fed. 358
(1903); Shanklin v. Ward, 291 Mo. 1, 236 S. W. 64 (1921) (court of equity
relieved one from the consequences of a mistake of title, even though the mistake
was one of law); Ossincup v. Henthorn, op. cit. supra, note 27. Accord: Conn.,
IlI., Ind., Me., Mass., Miss., Mo., N. H., N. Y., Ohio, Tenn., Wash., and Eng.
37 Turner v. Washington Realty Co., 128 S. C. 271, 122 S. E. 768 (1924);
Lane v. Holmes, 55 Minn. 379, 57 N. W. 132, 43 Am. St. Rep. 508 (1893) ("The
rule itself distinguishing mistake of law from mistake of fact is founded on no
sound principle."). Accord by statute: Cal., Mont., N. D., S. D., Okla., and Ga.
Boyle v. Maryland State Fair, 150 Md. 333, 134 AtU. 124 (1926) (relief
8
given where mistake of law is accompanied with fraud); Employers' Re-Insurance Corp. v. Going, 161 Tenn. 79, 26 S. W. (2d) 126 (1930) (relief given where
mistake of law is brought about by representations of the other party); Holm v.
Bramwell, 67 Pac. (2d) 114 (Cal. App., 1937); Tway v. Southern Methodist
Hospital & Sanitorium of Tuscon, 62 Pac. (2d) 1318 (Ariz., 1937) ("Voluntary
payments cannot be recovered, especially where there is no doubt of indebtedness
of payor to payee, and when payment is made without mistake, in absence of
fraud, duress, and coercion, and when payment should have been made in equity
and good conscience."); Gibson v. General American Life Ins. Co., 89 S. W. (2d)
1070 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936); Peterson v. First National Bank, 162 Minn. 369,
203 N. W. 53 (1925) (where one, without blame, makes a mistake of law and
fact, and the adverse party takes an unconscionable advantage, equity will relieve
the mistaken party).
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law, which under the circumstances it would be inequitable to retain,
39
equity will declare a constructive trust in favor of the payer. In few
jurisdictions has it been held that restitution of money paid under
a pure mistake of law, or in ignorance of the law, will be allowed,
where in good conscience the payee has no right to retain it.40 Equity
will always relieve against a mistake of law where an advantage has
in any way been taken of one's ignorance of law to mislead him, where
there has been some relation of trust and confidence which has been
abused, or where certain necessary information has been refused and
withheld, and the advantage inures to the wrongdoer, even though
no fraud was intended. 41 Where one of the parties is in a position of
authority enabling him to exert some influence upon the other, who in
rights and privileges makes a payment, recovery
ignorance of his legal
42
has been allowed.
A change of position acts so as to bar a recovery of money paid
under a mistake of law. If the payee has so changed his position as to
be unable to restore it without greater detriment than he would43have
incurred had the payment never been made, recovery is denied, unless the mistake was due to the defendant's own fault.
44
"Whenever a person is ignorant
Pomeroy states the general rule:

or mistaken with respect to his own antecedent and existing private
legal rights, interests, estates, duties, liabilities or other relation, either
of property or contract or personal status, and enters into some transaction in the legal scope and operation of which he correctly apprehends
and understands, for the purpose of affecting such assumed rights, interests, or relations or of carrying out such assumed duties or liabilities, equity will grant its relief, defensive or affirmative, treating the
mistake as analagous to, if not identical with, a mistake of fact."
David Gelber.
Frick v. Cone, 290 N. Y. S. 592 (1937); In re Turley's Estate, 289 N.
39
Y. S. 704 (1937); Curtis v. McKain, 94 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App., 1937).
40 Rockwell v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 102 Conn. 255, 128 AtI. 302 (1925);
Greene v. Taylor, 184 Ky. 739, 212 S. W. 925 (1919); McCarty v. Mobley, 14
Ga. App. 225, 80 S. E. 523 (1914).
Morris v. Morris, 247 N. Y. S. 28 (1932) ("Equity will relieve against
41
mistake of law to avoid unjust enrichment, or where mistake has been induced
by other party's misrepresentation, or where advantage has been taken of one's
ignorance, or relation of trust exists which has been abused.").
42 Manhatten Milling Co. v. Manhatten Gas & Electric Co., 115 Kan. 712,
225 Pac. 86 (1924).
43 Lindley v. United States, 59 Fed. (2d) 336 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Hullett
v. Cadick Milling Co., 90 Ind. App. 271, 168 N. E. 610 (1927); Pelletier v. State
National Bank, 117 La. 335, 41 So. 640 (1906); Wilson v. Barker, 50 Me. 447
(1862); Stadmiller v. Shirmer, 248 Mass. 244, 142 N. E. 905 (1924)- But, the
change of position is not available as a defense where a public utility is involved,
as the rates are fixed by statute. See: Strawberry Growers' Selling Co. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 31 Fed. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Right of Interstate
Carriers to Collect Undercharges (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 142.
44 Op. cit. supra note 34.
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TORTS-CONTRIBUTION-INSURANCE ComPANIEs. - The questions
involved in a treatment of this subject will arise in a factual situation
somewhat like the following. Suppose A and B are driving along the
highway so engrossed in their surroundings as to forget the rules of the
road, and as a result of their concurrent negligence, they collide. C, a
third party, is injured as a result of this collision, and sues to recover
the damages so incurred. C sues A, whose insurance company, X, completely satisfies the resulting judgment. B is insured in the Y insurance
company. Now what remedies has X, A's insurance company, as
against B or B's insurance company, Y?
A logical treatment of this subject requires first, a determination of
the existence or non-existence of the right of contribution between tortfeasors, which will involve a treatment of why the law has and has not
entertained the doctrine, and why and when it should entertain it;
second, having determined the instances in which the right of contribution will be allowed, it will treat of the question of the subrogation of
such right to that insurance company that has satisfied the entire claim
against its insured, such doctrine of subrogation seeming to be almost
a conclusion consequent to the determination of the existence of the
contributive right itself; and finally, the further consideration that
such insurance company might be allowed to proceed not only against
the fellow tort feasor, but, if he have insurance, the right to proceed
directly against his insurer.
, The long lines of cases dealing with this question would seem to indicate that there is a hopeless divergence of opinion as to whether or
not a tortfeasor, jointly or severally liable, has any remedy in case he
completely satisfies a judgment rendered against him, or against him
and his fellow tortfeasor. It is hard to see why courts would not allow
such contribution, and indeed, there is a general progression toward
accepting the doctrine. The courts are increasingly aware, or are being
made aware, of the inequality resulting from adherence to the old rule
absolutely denying contribution. The occasions for the application of
this doctrine in tort cases will undoubtedly increase in number and
variety. Therefore it would be well to indicate the divisions and classes
in which and outside of which contribution will and will not be allowed.
"Contribution may be defined as the payment by each or any of
several having a common liability because of loss suffered, or in money
necessarily paid by one of the parites in behalf of the others. The doctrine is not founded on contract, but comes from the application of principles of Equity to the condition in which the parties are found in consequence of some of them, as between themselves, having done more
than their share in performing a common obligation." 1
1

CoNTmsUT=ON, 13 C. J. 821.
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The general rule applicable to tortfeasors is stated as follows:
"Where one of several wrong-doers has been compelled to pay the damages for the wrong committed, the general rule is that he cannot compel
contribution from the others who participated in the commission of the
wrong." 2 The courts have made exceptions to this general rule.
A historical treatment of the subject will tend to show a strict adherence to judicial precedent, without an exploration into the reasons
for the denial of the doctrine, and the stability and reasonableness of
3
these reasons themselves. Merryweather v. Nixon, is the oldest case
cited in support of the general rule. Lord Kenyon said: "If A recover in
tort against two defendants and levy the whole damage on one, that one
cannot recover a moiety against the other for his contribution." The
basic reasons advanced for the doctrine are that the law will not adjust
differences between wrong-doers, but will leave them as it finds them;
that such adjustment of differences would tend toward the encouragement of tortious conduct; and no man can make his own misconduct
the ground for an action in his favor, for where the fault is mutual,
the law will leave the case as it finds it.
The harshness, inequality, and practical injustice which would follow and which has followed the strict application of this doctrine, has
led to judicial and statutory relaxation. This is only right. Furthermore, there are additional reasons why this rule should have exceptions.
One of the most apparent would seem to be the opportunity and inducement which the situation offers for a collusive agreement between
one of the tortfeasors and the injured person, a possibility which the
law will not anticipate, but which it cannot afford to overlook in its
attempt at the furtherance of human welfare.
The result is that equity, in which, because of the non-existence of
the legal remedy, the doctrine of contribution must find its source, taking cognizance of the situation, has propounded those situations in
which the doctrine will not be enforced by application of the maxim,
"He who comes into equity must do so with clean hands." There is left
to statutory pronouncement the duty of saying explicitly in what cases
it might, should, and will be entertained.
What is the basis of this equitable pronouncement? "Equity is
equality"; and a joint judgment debtor, coming into equity claiming
contribution, having paid the full amount of the judgment against both
of them, asks that his fellow tortfeasor be made to bear part of the
burden imposed on him, not because of his own negligence alone, but
because of their concurrent negligence, and because he has been made
to bear the brunt of a judgment, part of which at least is in the nature
of a penalty. If his plea will not be heard, has he not in effect been
2
3

CONTRIBUTION, 13 C. J. 828.

8 T. R. 186, 16 R. R. 810 (1799).
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made liable for the other's negligence, or unduly liable for his own
share? Has he not been made to pay for that for which he is not fully
responsible?
"But," the law replies, "He who comes into equity must do so with
clean hands." And equity in reply can point to those cases where, when
the hands of the plai.tiff were in truth not clean, he found, not relief in
equity, but deserved rebuke. No, rather would equity say to the law
that a petitioner ought not to be ousted before his plea is heard, but let
there first be an investigation into the merits of his plea, into the facts
surrounding the tort, for the purpose of determining whether or not
he has done that which will be held to constitute unclean hands.
What would be done to a claim for contribution where the claimant's
hands were unclean is indicated in many cases, one of which is Avery v.
Central Bank of Kansas City.4 In this case A and B were wilful wrongdoers, and their fraud involved moral turpitude. A paid all the damages
resulting from the wrong, and then sued B. The damages paid by A consisted in returning to the Bank money received from it in payment for
shares of its stock. A put back all the money for the stock he and B
had sold the bank, but received for his money only half of the shares
in return, B's heirs retaining the other shares. The court held A was
not entitled to contribution from B, because of the moral turpitude
involved in the commission of the tort, both on the part of A and on
the part of B. In this case the joint wrongdoer was benefited by the
court's refusal to enforce contribution against him, even though he too
was guilty of moral turpitude.
With moral turpitude may be bracketed such negligence as would
bar contributive recovery, gross negligence, for this would almost approach the objection of unclean hands. Thus, in Jacobs v. Pollard5 the
court said: "Wrongdoers cannot have redress or contribution against
each other upon being held liable for the unlawful act, but this rule is
confined to cases where the person claiming redress knew or must be
presumed to know the act to be unlawful." (Italics are mine.)
A further application of this rule in Griffiths v. National Fireproofing
Company0 resulted in a most equitable ruling, the court there saying:
"Where one does an act which produces an injury, and the other does
not join in the act, but is thereby exposed to liability and suffers damage, the law will inquire into the real delinquency and place the ultimate
liability on him whose fault was the primary cause of the injury." So
one who has been made liable on a vicarious basis, can seek recovery
from him whose actiive fault was the cause of the injury.
4

221 Mo. 71, 119 S. W. 1106 (1909).

6 10 Cush. 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105 (1852).
6

310 IL. 331, 141 N. E. 739 (1923).
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These cases indicate how far the investigation into the merits of the
plaintiff's plea might be carried before he would be denied any relief.
Minnesota and Wisconsin have gone very far in extending the exceptions to the present general rule, and the following cases will serve
to show what progress in that direction would ultimately lead the courts
to embrace.
In Ellis v. Chicago and Northwestern R. R.,7 the leading case on
contribution in the state of Wisconsin, the court firmly stated that in
cases of freedom from moral turpitude, contribution will be allowed.
Thus, in the same State, in the case of Mitchel v. Raymond,8 where action was brought by the passenger in one car against the driver of another car which collided with the one in which he was riding, the driver
of the passenger's car being made a party defendant, and each defendant having been proved negligent, proximately causing the injury,
neither guilty of gross negligence, the driver transporting the plaintiff
was held liable to contribute one-half of the judgment secured by the
plaintiff against the driver of the other car.
Therefore we can conclude that we have two instances in which
contribution should be granted, i. e., when the petitioner is free from
moral turpitude in the doing of the act, and when there is furthermore
a freedom from negligence so gross as to preclude recovery.
Wisconsin also carries this doctrine into the field of insurance, allowing the subrogation of the contributive right from one of the tortfeasors
to his insurer. Thus, in the case of the Western Casualty and Surety
Company v. The Milwaukee General Construction Company 9 it was
held that in an action to recover from the defendant one-half of the
amount paid in settlement of damages caused by the concurring negligence of the Western Casualty and Indemnity Company's insured,
(one Clas) and the Milwaukee General Construction Company, when
the casualty company had paid off its policy holder's liability, a decision of the trial court sustaining a demurrer by the Milwaukee General Construction Co., was error, the Supreme Court on appeal declaring,
that the court should entertain the Casualty Company's cause for contribution when there was freedom from moral turpitude-on the part of
that company's insured. The right was established; its subrogation was
recognized.
Exactly in line with this train of thought is a Minnesota case, Underwriter's at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith,' 0 wherein the court said:
"The rule that courts will not allow contribution between wrongdoers is
subject to many exceptions." An automobile passenger was injured in
7

167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918).

8 181 Wis. 591, 195 N. W. 855 (1923).
9

10

251 Wis. 491, 213 Wis. 302, 251 N. W. 491 (1933).
166 Minn. 388, 208 N. W. 13 (1926).
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a collision caused by the negligence of both drivers, and recovered on
judgment against one of the drivers whose insurer paid, the court said
that "the insurer is entitled to contribution from the other; one compelled to respond in damages for negligence may enforce contributions
from others jointly liable. Where the ground of liability is simply the
negligence of each while engaged in lawful undertakings, the one compelled to respond in damages may enforce contribution from the
others." Here the insurer is suing the insured's joint tortfeasor for contribution on the ground that the insured had the right of contribution
against the defendant, and, since the insurer has paid, it is entitled by
subrogation to the rights of the insured. The appeal from the trial
court's decision sustaining demurrer allowed, decision reversed and
remanded.
In California, where the right of contribution is not recognized,
there is consequently no right of action in the indemnitor insurance
company which satisfies the plaintiff's judgment against the joint tortfeasor insured as against the other joint tortfeasors. 11
So also in a recent case in the state of Ohio, that is, the case of
United States Casualty Company v. Indemnity Company of North
America,12 the doctrine of contribution received no recognition, and
when the plaintiff's attorney tried to establish a co-surety relation between the insurers of two joint judgment debtors, the court held that
no such relation actually or technically existed, and since this was the
only basis for the plaintiff's plea for contribution, he must fail. "The
joint judgment obtained does not reach back to make the companies cosuretors, and what they were not in the beginning, the judgment does
not make them now." Judge Williams dissented, and with a strong contrary opinion seemingly based on the primary question of the right of
contribution and the subsequent determination of whether or not that
right could be said to exist in the insurer. His views on the subject
were sympathetic with the Minnesota and Wisconsin decisions cited.
above.
A recent case in North Carolina might be cited to indicate the unwillingness of the law to take the necessary steps to do something about
the settlement of these differences. In the case of Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Company v. The United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.13
the court said that "where the injured person recovered judgment
against both of the drivers of the automobiles involved in collision,"
even "a statute contemplating contribution between the joint tortfeasors and the joint judgment debtors," gives the insurer on one liability policy no right of action against the insurer of the other automobile for one-half of the amount of the damage paid. Here it is ad11 Adams v. White Bus Lines, 50 Cal. App. 82, 195 Pac. 290 (1921).
12

129 Ohio St. 391, 195 N. E. 850 (1935).

18 188 S. E. 634 (N. C. 1936).
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mitted the contributive right would have been enforced, but the court
would not, in the absence of statute, hold that such right was subrogated to the insurer upon payment of the insured's responsibility. The
insured's right of contribution was held not to be subrogated to his insurer.
The conclusions to be drawn from this survey would seem apparent.
In the absence of moral turpitude and gross negligence, a person held
liable to respond in damages for the entire amount of injury caused
by his negligence concurrent with that of another should be allowed
to recover from that other some compensatory amount. This doctrine
of contribution should continue to find wider and wider application in
the equitable adjustment of unequal burdens placed on wrongdoers
who are free from gross negligence and moral turpitude. The right of
contribution resulting from such law (created preferably by statute in
view of many of the courts' unwillingness to take decisive progressive
steps in the absence of such statutes) ought to be subrogated (again
by statute where necessary) to the rights of the insurer who has satisfied the claim of the joint judgment debtor. In the event of the inability
of the joint judgment debtor to pay because of his insolvency, the indemnitor should have the power to reach the joint judgment debtor's
insurance company, if not directly, at least on the basis of a creditor's
rights analogy, regarding such policy as an asset of the debtor's and as
such, subject to recovery by a creditor, which such indemnitor would,
in fact, be. This third and last step is admittedly but a consequence of
the prior determination of the existence of the contributive right, and
the extension of the application of the doctrine of subrogation.
John A. O'Leary.

TORTS-EXCEPTIONS

TO THE RULE OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR

INSTRUMENTALITY.-In Perry v.
Can. Headwear Co." the parties being tenants of the same landlord, occupied the third and fourth floors respectively. On a Saturday about
noon the defendant went into the wash room on his premises, and there
discovered a leak in the wooden water tank above the bowl. After making an unsuccessful attempt to contact the landlord, who, according to
the lease, was responsible for repairs, the defendant attempted to shut
off the water supply running to the bowl, and because of the condition
of the old plumbing accomplished his purpose only by the use of a
wrench on the intake valve above the water tank. He then flushed the
toilet to empty the bowl. Upon inspection a half hour later, when, as
yet, there was no water in the wooden bowl, the defendant concluded
DAMAGE CAUSED BY A DANGEROUS

1

This case is commented on, 7 FORTNIGHTLY L. JOUR. 72.
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his own plumbing was successful. However, returning after the weekend, the plaintiff found his premise, consisting mostly of perishable
goods, damaged by a great supply of water. Investigation showed it had
seeped through from the water-closet of the defendant. A plumber was
called immediately who remedied the leak by replacing washers in the
intake valve and in the wooden bowl, and the evidence established that
the destruction of the washer in the valve was undoubtedly due to the
use of the wrench by the self-appointed plumber, the defendant. The
plaintiff's two-fold theory of action was, first, negligence in failing to
use reasonable precaution to prevent the escape of water, not only because of the defective condition of the plumbing but also because of the
defendant's unsuccessful efforts to act as a plumber, and, secondly, the
principle of Rylands v. Fletcher.2 Held, that there was reasonable precaution in the defendant's action of Saturday noon by personally attempting to repair the plumbing, and more important, for the sake of
this comment, that the plumbing was a natural use of the premise and
that the doctrine of this famous English case-that is, absolute liability
for the escape of water if it is being put to a nonnatural use -is inapplicable.
In this decision we see a modern exemplification of one of the six
exceptions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher as set forth by Salmond
in his book, "Law of Torts." American opinions as to what is a "natural" use of the land have followed this idea so that in Ohio steamboilers have been held a "natural" use,8 in Missouri, water pipes; 4
and it has even been held in a Minnesota case that a dam across a
stream to obtain power for a mill was- "not unnatural or unusual use,
but the contrary." 5
The Canadian court in the Perry case must have been considering as
precedent the case of Western Engraving Co. v. Film Laboratories
Ltd.,6 when they qualified the word "plumbing" by the term "ordinary,"
in ruling that there was a natural use of the land. In the Western Engraving Company case the plaintiffs occupied the first floor of a premise,
and the defendants, the Film Laboratories, the second. The work of the
defendants consisted chiefly in washing moving picture films. This, of
course, necessitated large quantities of circulating waters. An overflow
of this water caused the damage for which the plaintiff sought relief.
The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher,and not the exception as decreed in the
Perry case, definitely covers this situation, for the use of the water and
L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
8 Huff v. Austin, 46 Ohio St. 386 (1889).
4 McCord Rubber Co. v. St. Joseph Water Co., 181 Mo. 678, 81 S. W. 189
2

(1904).

5 City Water Power Co. v. The City of Fergus Falls, 113 Minn. 33, 128 N. W.
817 (1910).
8 (1936] 1 Al E. R. 106.
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the plumbing of this defendant was extraordinary and nonnatural,
creating absolute liability.
Another of Salmond's exceptions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
states that the nonnatural user is not responsible for acts of a third
party. A case with exactly the same factual situation, except that the
defendant's wash-bowl overflowed because some party, not known,
stuffed packing in the waste pipe and then turned on the water. This
case, Richards v. Lothian,7 holds that the rule of absolute liability for
the escape of water does not apply for it was caused by the malicious act
of a third party. So, also, Box v. Jubb,8 an early English case, in which
a third party emptied his reservoir into that of the defendant's, the
court refused to decree liability because of the act of a stranger.
American cases are in accord with this exception; and the courts
of all jurisdictions have held that the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher
includes not only absolute liability for the escape of water, but also
liability for nonnatural use of the premise because of the damage caused
by dangerous instrumentalities, as explosives, electricity, as well as wild
animals. In a New York case a landlord was repairing his premise and
had, during the night, an iron grating around the place being repaired,
and also had a night-watchman to guard the premise during the night.
When the watchman was on the other side of the building, without
negligence, a third person removed the iron railing and the plaintiff fell
into the hole. Here the act of the stranger exempted the defendant from
liability for he was held not responsible for these acts. 9 In another case,
an amusement park was operating a roller-coaster, and some stranger,
party not known, placed on the track some chips which caused the
cars to be derailed, strike the plaintiff and cause the damage complained
of. Liability was not absolute here because of the act of the third
10
party.
If the factual situation is such that the plaintiff consents to the admission upon the premise of the defendant of the dangerous instrumentality, another exception to the rule, avoiding absolute liability, can be
shown. In Richards v. Lothian the court decreed that since the water
was brought into the building for the benefit of both tenants, neither
could object to its escape if no negligence could be shown. There was
implied consent on the part of both parties. In the Perry case the court
did not base its decision upon this exception, but may have considered
it had not the exception, that plumbing was a natural- use of the land,
been in point. When one of these dangerous instrumentalities is brought
on the land for the mutual benefit of the tarties to the action, implied
7
8

[1913] A. C. 263.
Ex. D. 76 (1879).

Wasson v. Pettit, 117 N. Y. 118, 22 N. E. 566 (1889).
See: Knotterus v. North Park Street R. R. Co., 93 Mich. 348, 53 N. W.
529 (1892).
9
10
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consent is understood and must be rebutted by the plaintiff's evidence.
Ross v. Fedden," another English case, also involves two occupants of
the same premise, one seeking damages for the injury caused by water
seeping down from the mains of the upper occupant. This case held that
there was implied consent. In Richards v. Lothian 12 it was said of the
Ross case that, "the only ground taken by the plaintiff is that the plaintiffs and defendants being occupiers under the same landlord, the defendant being occupier of the upper story, contiacted an obligation
bringing them in favour of the plaintiff, the occupier of the lower story
to keep the water in at their peril. I do not agree to that; I do not
think the maxim: 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' applies." There
is no such obligation as this between the respective tenants, the court
goes on to suggest. However, both of these English cases, along with
Carstairsv. Taylor,13 hold that such a consent is given and is the basis
of a defense for the defendant.
An interesting series of Kentucky cases have included this exception,
in ruling on the dangerous instrumentality, electricity. In Mangan's Administrator v. Louisville Electric Company 14 the plaintiff's intestate
was a customer of the defendant company and was injured by an electrical discharge from the defendant's wire. No negligence was shown
and the rule of absolute liability was refused because of the mutual
benefit of the parties in the reception and distribution of the electricity
which showed consent on the part of the intestate to permit the wires
to extend on the premise. Other Kentucky cases uphold this, one of
which held that a lineman's administrator could not recover without
showing negligence for there was consent on the part of the lineman to
work around the dangerous instrumentality.' 5 However, another case,
Owensboro v. Knox's Administrator,16 held that where the plaintiff's intestate was walking along the highway and was killed by a discharge
from an uninsulated wire, absolute liability could be imposed for no
implied consent was given.
Public Utilities have been given relief from this absolute liability
rule under the exception that the dangerous instrumentality is a necessary pre-requisite to carrying out a legislative enactment. In Blyth
v. Birmingham Waterworks Company 17 the water company had observed the directions of the Act of Parliament in laying down pipes, and
is not responsible for water escaping when no negligence can be shown.
So a gas company was excused from absolute liability when injury was
11 L. R. 7 Q. B. 661 (1872).
12 [1913] A. C. 263, 281.
is L. R. 6 Ex. 217 (1871).
14 122 Ky. 476, 91 S. W. 703 (1909).
15 Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Searey, 168 Ky. 840, 181 S. W. 662 (1916).
Accord: West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Key, 178 Ky. 224, 198 S. W. 724 (1917).
16 116 Ky. 451, 76 S. W. 191 (1903).
17 11 Ex. 781 (1856).
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caused by escaping gas; 1 8 also, the doctrine of absolute liability was
not applied to injury caused by a steam railway when the sparks from
a boiler caused damage to a premise.' All relief in these cases was
granted on the basis of legislative sanction given to the defendants to
use these dangerous instrumentalities in a nonnatural manner. American utilities have been relieved under the same rule. Hutchinson v. Boston Gas Light Company 20 is a case in which because of the escape of
gas from the defendant's mains, a combustion occurred, and the plaintiff was burned while trying to escape from the fire. No negligence was
shown on the part of the company, and the Massachusetts court refused to apply the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher because the gas company had been given statutory authority to lay the mains. The New
York court has gone even further, holding that where the government
had given its sanction to the National Zoological Garden to house wild
animals, the doctrine of absolute liability was refused where a plaintiff, injured by a wild beast, could not show negligence. 2 ' However, a
recent Texas case refused to relieve a city of liability under this rule.
In the case, City of Brady v. Cox,2 2 a city had raised the level of a
street above that of adjacent landowners and after a heavy rain the
water flooded down upon the plaintiff's premise. The court held that
even though statutory authority had been given the city to so improve
the streets, "one diverting flood waters or impounding them on his
premise is liable to his neighbor for damages caused thereby, regardless
of negligence in constructing drains."
The best known and most frequently employed exception to the
doctrine of absolute liability for the nonnatural use of land by harboring dangerous instrumentalities is if an Act of God intervenes. An early
leading case considering this exception was Nichols v. Marsland.23 The
defendant was in possession of certain artificial pools formed by damming a natural stream. Although the embankments were considered
well-constructed, a violent storm, of such magnitude that it was unforeseeable, flooded these artificial pools and all the water rushed onto the
land of the plaintiff. Since no negligence was shown, the court refused
to permit the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine because of the act of God.
So, also, in the case of Nitrophosphate & Manure Co. v. London and
St. Katherine Docks Co. 24 the defendants were sued for the damage
caused by an unusually high tide, owing to their retaining bank not
being sufficiently high. Fry, J., stated that even though the tide was
not unique, the fact that it was extraordinary was sufficient to place the
18

19
20
21
22

Price v. Metropolitan Gas Co., 65 L. J. Q. B. 126 (1895).
Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co., 5 H. & N. 679 (1860).
122 Mass. 219 (1872).
Malloy v. Starin, 191 N. Y. 21, 83 N. Y. 588 (1907).
48 S. W. (2d) 511

(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).

23

L. R. 10 Ex. 255 (1875).

24

9 Ch. Div. 515 (1878).
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ruling within the exception of the Act of God. Many American cases
support these rulings. Sutliff v. Sweetwater Water Co. 2 5 a recent California case, held that where the water company had constructed a
reservoir and during an unprecedented flood the walls of the reservoir
gave way, the plaintiff must show negligence to enable him to recover.
In Perkins v. Vermont Hydro-Electric Corporation2 it was shown that
the company was negligent in construction of the retaining wall to the
reservoir but that the accident would not have happened but for an
unprecedented flood. The exception applied to the case where the Act
of God would have caused the injury irrespective of the negligence,
but it is for the jury to determine whether the flood was of such magnitude as this.
The final exception, as set out by Salmond, is that if the injured
party is a trespasser or if the injury would not have occurred but for
the nonnatural use by the plaintiff of his property, the defendant will
not be liable under the rule. In relation to the consideration of no liability because the person was a trespasser, the case Postmaster-General
v. Liverpool Corporation exemplifies the rule.2

7

The plaintiffs were

claiming damage for the injury to their own telephone poles, lines, and
cables. It was shown that there was no negligence on the part of the
defendant, although a wire was exposed on the defendant's line which
permitted the escape of electric current causing the injury complained
of. The court stated that since the plaintiffs were guilty of laying their
cable too close to the other cables, and on the property of the defendant,
they cannot recover in this action. American cases on this point are
numerous and covered by various doctrines. An interesting case showing the adoption of the exception is Hughes v. Boston Maine R. R. 28
A child of tender years found upon the premise of the defendant a
torpedo with which he began to play. The point at which it was found
was a place that the railway company knew many people passed and
without objection. The torpedo exploded causing the injury. Liability
of the defendant was refused because the intermeddling of the plaintiff
without right was a trespass.
As to the second part of this exception, that if the plaintiff is also
using his property unnaturally and, but for this there would have been
no injury, utility companies have used this frequently. In Eastern and
South African Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Cape Town Tramways Companies,
Ltd.,29 the tramway company was held not liable for the disturbance

of the working of the plaintiff's telegraph cables by electricity escaping
fr6m the wires. So, also, in the case of Lake Shore and M. S. Railway
25
28

27
28

20

182 Cal. 84, 186 Pac. 766 (1920).
177 At. 632 (Vt. 1934).
[1923] A. C. 587.
71 N. H. 279, 51 At. 1070 (1902).
[1902] A. C. 381.
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Co. v. Chicago, Lake Shore and S. B. R. Co.3O the fact that the electrical lines, high tension wires, caused disturbances to the plaintiff's
telegraph wires, and that all the electrical conductors in proximity are
caused to have similar electrical currents does not create absolute liability because of the nonnatural use of the land by the plaintiff and because statutory authority permitted the operation of the electrical line.
Many explanations have been conjured as to why the doctrine of
absolute liability at one time met with such universal acceptance at
first, at a later time there was a tendency to repudiate it, was, and then
again there has been a tendency to accept it. Both philosophical and
economical reasons have been set out to try to establish these changes.
Professor Bohlen reasons that because the judges of England and this
country came from a different strata of society during the nineteenth
century that the opinions adopted by these jurists on opposite sides of
the Atlantic should differ. In England, it was pointed out the judges
were chosen from a highly organized society, from the dominating class
of landowners, motivated with the intention to establish themselves
above all the rest. Since the land itself meant so much to these men
and since the natural resources were so fully developed, the controlling
desire was to preserve wealth- hence absolute liability for its destruction. Opposed to this is the reasoning that the American judges come
from the commercial and artisan classes, that they serve a pioneer
country interested in exploiting the natural resources, and therefore
the preservation of the land is not so paramount, but rather opportunity and chance is encouraged, so absolute liability is refused. Professor
Bohlen's conclusion is that the recent trend of the American courts to
adopt some of the rules of absolute liability and refuse to find any
more exceptions to the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, rests in the fact
that today the American judges are not only being chosen from the
dominating class of society, but the country is giving more value to the
.preservation of land, and the development of natural resources is secondary to conservation of them.
However, it can be pointed out that a consideration of the jurisdictions which have lately adopted the rule of absolute liability are from
all sections of the country and engross all the ideas of land value. In
Shipley v. Associates 31 the Massachusetts court followed the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher and a year later the Supreme Court of Minnesota
adopted the rule. 3 2 Ohio has accepted it, Indiana rejected it, West Virginia accepted it, Kentucky refused it-which shows that neither the
location nor the kind of work for which the jurisdiction is geographical30

31
32

48 Ind. App. 584 (1910).
106 Mass. 194 (1870).
Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871).
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ly fit alters the judge's decision. 88 Another opinion which has been presented as the basis for the rejection of the rule is that first in England
and only of late in this country has the general security of the country
been considered vastly important. ,Pioneer ideas and less crowded and
primarily agricultural communities linger behind the idea that the general security of the country is so important. This idea seems to stimulate the reasoning that not class conflict but a gradual change in the
economic situation which exerts a gradual indirect but constant pressure on the judistic idea of the economic basis of the iule.
Philosophically, the earl idea of the law-makers was to keep peace
and this was the influence under which the Greeks and Romans labored
in establishing their very influential principles. The Middle Ages found
the jurists endeavoring merely to maintain the status quo of the existing society by enforcing reciprocal duties. It was under this influence
that the doctrine of absolute liability was first introduced into the law.
However, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the historical
and metaphysical schools of jurisprudence began to function, effecting
a change on the attitude of the Roman Law and that of the Middle
Ages concerning absolute liability. It was in the nineteenth century,
mainly through the influence of Hegel and Kant, that these two schools
84
united to form the motivating influence behind that legal thought.
With Kant's theory of autonomous human reason becoming paramount
in the minds of the jurists of that time, the idea of no liability without
fault would logically flow, for since man was responsible only to himself and no one else, his liability to another could be predicated only
through fault. With this metaphysical-analytical theory forming the
basis of judicial thought, but the precedent of Rylands v. Fletcher still
confronting the jurists, the disappearance of the doctrine could be
blotted from the records only by a flood of exceptions. This was attempted. More recently, however, when the fallacy of Kant's philosophy
has become established, and it has been accepted that man has a duty
not only to himself, but also to God and to his fellow-man, there has
been a tendency to again adopt the rule of absolute liability in cases
where the dangerous agencies causing the injury created an absolute
duty toward every fellow-man. The Scholastic idea that the individual
is a moral unit and hence a political unit having equal moral responsibilities to his fellow-man has promulgated the philosophical basis for
a renewal of the rules of absolute liability.
Based on this rejuvenated philosophical idea and the economic theory that greater general security is desired, the courts, both of England
8
Defiance Water Company v. Olinger, 54 Ohio St. 532, 44 N. E. 238 (1896);
Weaver v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S. E. 126; Lake Shore R. Co. v. Chicago
R. Co., 48 Ind. App. 584 (1910); Owensboro v. Knox, 116 Ky. 451, 76 S. W. 191
(1903).
84
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and this country, have refused to limit the doctrine to adjacent land
holders, and have extended it to many new situations of fact. Especially have statutory enactments extended these rules,--an Indiana statute 35 providing an absolute duty on the part of corporations, partnerships, or individuals to cut or eradicate Canadian thistle; and it would
seem to follow that if this were not done there would be a civil liability
to the person injured. Secondly, the statutes in some jurisdictions impose absolute liability for escape from one's premise by fire kindled
thereon, under certain conditions, as, for example, fire communicated
from railroad locomotives to property of others,3 6 and for fires set during certain seasons of the year for the purpose of burning stubble.37
Other instances of statutes imposing absolute liability are: (1) A
statute imposing absolute liability on the owner or keeper of a dog for
biting a person; 38 (2) The Workmen's Compensation Acts (compensation being in no sense dependent on negligence of the defendant);39
(3) The statutes providing that sales of goods in bulk shall be in fraud
of creditors, though no fraud is in fact perpetrated; 40 and (4) Statutes
imposing liability on owner of dog for injury done to cattle or sheep,
irrespective of whether or not the owner knew of any mischievous pro41
pensity of the dog, or was negligent in keeping the dog.
Probably the oldest theory of tort liability was that liability without
regard to fault. It was a maxim of early law, chiefly applicable to physical tort, that "he that is damaged ought to be recompensed, the existence of blameworthiness was immaterial." 42 Examples of strict liability today, in addition to extra-hazardous user doctrine, are (1) One
who enters upon land of another is liable in trespass, even though he
honestly and reasonably believes the land is his own or he has a right
of entry; 4 3 (2) He who attacks another's reputation does so at his peril;

(3) Persons who exercise acts of ownership over chattels of another do
so at their peril; 44 (4) Liability of the master for torts of the servant
committed in scope of employment, where acts are not authorized by
master, and even where expressly forbidden by him; 45 (5)
35
36

Liability

Ind. Acts. (1937) 793.
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Kreager, 61 Oh. St. 312, 56 N. E. 203

(1899); THROCEmORTON'S COOLEY ow TORTS 705.
37 Seckerson v. Sinclair, 24 N. D. 625, 140 N. W. 239 (1913); THROCK3mORTON'S COOLEY Ox TORTS 705.
88 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) par. 3357.
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of husband for torts of his wife; 46 (6) Liability of a corporation for
47
the acts of directors and other agents for conduct of its affairs;
(7) Liability of a partner for torts of his partner in and about the
partnership business; 48 (8) Liability of owner, or keeper, of certain
animals for damage done by them in straying onto another's land;
(9) Liability in case of blasting where substances are thrown on another's premises; (10) Liability for excavating on one's own land, producing a subsidence in the surface of another's land, or in soil falling
away from anothers' land; (11) Liability for harm due to an absolute
nuisance (as distinguished from a nuisance due to negligence); and
(12) In "Slander of Title" fault is not requisite to sustain an action
49
against a stranger.
Nothing unusually startling comes into the mind when considering
these rules of absolute liability nor when considering the exceptions to
them. The fact that it was a general doctrine of the early common law
shows that it was readily understood and accepted that reciprocal duties
existed among men. But in the nineteenth century there was the tendency to connect liability and fault as a general juristic doctrine, and
Pound says, "all the historical common law liabilities without regard
to fault were re-examined judicially and for a time there was a strong
tendency to limit them. Thus liability for injuries by trespassing animals
was limited in Cox v. Burbidge and more than one American court requires culpability or knowledge of a vicious propensity in such cases.
One American court went so far as to require culpability even where
there was a known vicious propensity in case the animal escaped in a
way not reasonably to be anticipated. The limitation of employer's liability by the fellow-servant rule was a part of this movement." 50 In
New Hampshire, Chief Justice Doe rejected the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher as running counter to the principle that liability must be based
upon fault. 51 What would Justice Doe have decided in the case of absolute nuisance, liability of trespassing animals, etc.? Would he have
held there was no liability in these instances if there were no fault?
It was during this movement to which Dean Pound refers, that these
many exceptions to the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher were decreed. Now
that the tendency is again in favor of this rule of absolute liability, it
will be interesting to see how the jurists adapt their prevailing ideas
to these well-established and very reasonable exceptions.
John De Mots.
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TRUSTS-WHO MAY EXECUTE A TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF THE

TRUSTEE?-Trusts are matters of confidence reposed in the trustee,
who is invested with legal title and control of the trust property. As was
clearly explained in Whittelsey v. Hughes,1 they must be executed by
the person or persons to whom they are confided, consequently the
duties of the office of trustee cannot be delegated by him to another
unless the instrument creating the trust clearly confers such power upon him.
The question often arises concerning the proper person to occupy the
position of the deceased trustee. The death of the trustee will not terminate the trust. The continuance of the trust is not dependent on the
life of any particular trustee. Equity will supply a successor, for it will
not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee. In Hitchock v. Board of
Home Missions of PresbyterianChurch 2 the court adhered to the equitable maxim, "Equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a
trustee." According to the courts discussion, if no trustee is named, or
the trustee named is non-existent or incompetent or refuses to accept
the trust, chancery will supply a trustee, and the settlor's intent will
be effectuated. Although the settlor generally makes provision for the
appointment of a new trustee in case the first trustee dies, there are
many instances in which the settlor has failed to so provide.
It is obvious that the legal title to the trust property which has been
vested in the deceased trustee can no longer remain there, but it must
be transferred to some one upon the trustee's death. It will not be allowed to remain in suspense.
According to the common law, the ownership of the trust property
devolves upon the persons who would take the absolute property of the
deceased. The case of Baltimore Trust Co. v. Georges Creek Coal &
Iron Co.8 discusses the general principle that trusts of real estate devolve upon the heirs of the deceased trustee, and trusts of personalty
devolve upon the executor or administrator for the preservation of the
title, until the appointment of a new trustee. It is well recognized that
the heirs become the owner of real property and the personal represen4
tative the owner of personal property upon the death of the trustee.
Although the common law relative to this particular is followed in
many states, its meaning should not be misconstrued. Although the
title to the property will immediately vest in the heirs and personal
representative, nevertheless it generally remains there only for a short
1
2
3
4

39 Mo. 13 (1866).
259 Ill.288, 102 N. E. 741 (1913).
119 Md. 21, 85 At. 949 (1912).
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N. E. 918 (1899).
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length of time. A petition for the appointment of a new trustee is filed
with the court, which in turn will make provision for the appointment.
In several states, statutes modifying the common-law rule regarding
the devolution of trust property have been enacted. These statutes vest
the title to the trust property immediately upon the death of the sole
trustee in the court having general equity jurisdiction and require the
court to appoint a trustee to carry out the trust to its conclusion, and
the statutes also prescribe when and how equity may appoint trustees.
Whitehead v. Whitehead 5 is' frequently cited in discussions concerning
the statutes so enacted. In that case, the court stated that "on the
death of the trustee the estate does not descend to his heirs or pass to
his personal representatives, the executor of the will of a trustee does not
succeed to the right to administer the trust, but title will vest in the
court."
In determining the power of a trustee, the intent of the settlor is
absolutely controlling. This fact is brought out in a recent decision
which held that as the discretionary power of a trustee to apply the
prinicpal of a trust fund for the benefit of the cestui is a matter of personal confidence, it cannot be exercised by a trustee appointed by the
court upon the death of the original trustee. In Whitaker v. McDowell 6
the court's statement was to the effect that "where a power is a matter
of personal confidence which is to be executed in the discretion of the
trustee, it cannot be extended beyond the intention of the donor, and
cannot be exercised by a trustee appointed by the court upon the death
of the original trustee."
Where there are several trustees and one dies, it is preferable that
the surviving trustees, who have knowledge of the trust and have been
selected by the settlor, should administer the trust, rather than the administration should be continued by such survivors in common with
the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased trustee. However,
such heirs or personal representatives may have no special fitness for the
task of carrying on the trust and it is only when the title can rest nowhere else that the trust devolves upon them. It has been held that the
heir of the last survivor of several trustees to sell land cannot execute
the trust or power of sale, because not pointed out in the instrument as
one within the contemplation of the settlor. In Ames Cases on Trusts 7
it is stated that it must be understood that though the person in quesion is not indicated in the instrument as one to succeed to the trust,
yet once having the legal title he must always hold the pioperty subject
to the trust.
5 142 Ala. 163, 37 So. 929 (1904).
6 82 Conn. 148, 72 AtI. 938 (1909).
7 P. 226, notes 1, 2.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
It is interesting to note in this connection that it is well settled that
the widow of a trustee is not entitled to dower in the trust property, 8
and the widower of a trustee has no rights of curtesy. 9
As we have said before, equity will not permit a trust to fail. In an
Illinois case, French v. Northern Trust Co., 10 a will named a general
trustee for the whole estate, to whom all property was devised, which
property was to pass on the death of the testator to the executors and
trustees of his will. A separate trust was created for a share, subject to
supervisory power of a general trustee, with power to appoint a trustee
and the executor declined to act. It was said in the opinion that "as
equity will not permit a trust to fail for want of a trustee, the court
properly appoints a trustee for the separate trust."
A recent Missouri case, Clark v. Beal," held that an equity court
had inherent authority to appoint a trustee to administer the trust estate
arising under a will. The court declared that it had power to make a
valid appointment of a successor to a deceased testamentary trustee.
New York was a pioneer in the enactment of statutes relative to the
execution of a trust after the death of a trustee. Under the statutes of
this State, when an instrument does not provide for the termination
of the trust on the death of the trustee, then upon the death of the
trustee the further execution of the trust vests in the Supreme Court
until a new trustee is appointed. 12 Michigan, on the other hand in a
recent decision, Oakland County v. Mack,' 3 shows the tendency to
adopt the common law, in holding that legal title to real estate devolves
on the trustee's heirs at his death, and the right of reverter or re-entry
on condition broken also passes to his heirs, all impressed with a trust.
After studying the cases, we find, generally speaking, and except as
it may be otherwise provided by statute, or by the trust instrument,
upon the death of the trustee and pending appointment if any, of a
new trustee the trusteeship devolves on the survivors, if any.' 4 If there
be no survivors it devolves on the heirs or representatives of the de8 Barber v. Smiley, 218 ill. 68, 75 N. E. 787 (1905); Miller v. Miller, 148
Mo. 113, 49 S. W. 852 (1899).

9 King v. Bushnell, 121 Ill. 656, 13 N. E. 245 (1887).
10 197 Ill. 30, 64 N. E. 105 (1902).
11 67 S. W. (2d) 114 (Mo. 1934).
12 Williams v. Fischlein, 129 N. Y. S. 129 (1911).
The New York statute provides: "On the death of the last surviving or sole
surviving trustee of an express trust the trust estate shall not descend to his heirs
nor pass to his next of kin or personal representatives; but in the absence of a
contrary direction on the part of the person creating the same, such trust, if unexecuted, shall vest in the Supreme Court. . . ." N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS (Cahill's
1930) c. 51, § 111.
13 243 Mich. 229, 220 N. W. 801 (1928).

14 Jencks v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 120 Md. 626, 87 At.
1031 (1913).

